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Abstract
China is one of the most active states in concluding bilateral investment trea-
ties (BITs) globally. Its BITs can be categorized into three generations based on 
the homogeneity of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions within 
each generation. The China–EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and the 
China–US BIT under negotiation are expected to inaugurate a fourth generation, 
although China’s stance on ISDS in both treaties remains indeterminate. This article 
elaborates on the distinctive characteristics of ISDS provisions by mapping three 
generations of Chinese BITs, presenting the challenges that these ISDS provisions 
have brought to light in investor-state adjudication as well as in the context of the 
Belt and Road Initiative, and expounding on China’s policy options in ISDS reform. 
The on-going intense debate on ISDS reform presents China with an opportunity 
to shift from its traditional role of a rule-taker to a rule-maker in redesigning the 
ISDS mechanism. However, China’s current policy and practice do not demonstrate 
an ambition for such a transformation. Looking forward, it may well be in China’s 
long-term interest to endorse a Multilateral Investment Court as vigorously advo-
cated by the EU.
Keywords Belt and Road Initiative · China–EU CAI · China–US BIT · Chinese 
bilateral investment treaties · International investment law · Investor-state dispute 
settlement · Multilateral Investment Court
 * Yuwen Li 
 y.li@law.eur.nl
 Cheng Bian 
 bian@law.eur.nl
1 Professor of Chinese Law, Director of Erasmus China Law Centre, Erasmus School of Law, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
2 Academic Researcher, Erasmus China Law Centre, Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
504 Y. Li, C. Bian 
123
1 Introduction
The conclusion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the global scale has been 
one of the most dynamic fields of international investment law during the past few 
decades. Starting with the first BIT signed between West Germany and Pakistan in 
1959, there have been 2897 BITs and 390 treaties with investment provisions con-
cluded globally by May 2020.1 The proliferation of BITs worldwide is driven by 
some of the most active signatory countries, among which China plays a significant 
role. Since it signed the first BIT with Sweden in 1982, China has signed 138 BITs, 
and 126 of them are currently in force, second only to Germany in terms of the 
number of BITs concluded. In addition, China has concluded one trilateral invest-
ment agreement with Japan and South Korea in 2012 and 13 free trade agreements 
(FTAs) containing investment provisions.2
Chinese BITs can be distinguished into three generations in terms of their differ-
ent levels of substantive protection and their disparate characteristics of investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions.3 The ISDS mechanism has always been 
1 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, International Investment Agreements Navigator, available at: https 
://inves tment polic yhub.uncta d.org/IIA (accessed 23 September 2020).
2 Specifically, China has entered into FTAs with Chile (2005) (renegotiated in 2017), Pakistan (2006), 
New Zealand (2008), Singapore (2008) (renegotiated in 2018), Peru (2009), ASEAN (2009) (renego-
tiated in 2015), Costa Rica (2010), Iceland (2013), Switzerland (2013), South Korea (2015), Australia 
(2015), Georgia (2017), and Maldives (2017). Some of these FTAs do not contain investment provisions 
(e.g., the China-Georgia FTA). Some only provide a general framework for the promotion of investment 
without viable investment protection provisions (e.g., the China-Switzerland FTA). Some incorporate the 
text of previously negotiated BITs between China and the same signatory state as an integral part of the 
investment provisions in the FTA (e.g., the China-Costa Rica FTA). And there are FTAs that include a 
comprehensive or updated investment chapter, where investment topics are extensively addressed next to 
trade, including the China-New Zealand FTA (2008), the China-ASEAN Agreement (2009), the China-
South Korea FTA (2015) and the China-Australia FTA (2015). Based on the modality in which such 
investment chapters are stipulated, the ISDS mechanism in the China-New Zealand FTA (2008) in its 
essence is equivalent to the ISDS in second generation Chinese BITs, whereas the China-ASEAN Invest-
ment Agreement (2009), the China-South Korea FTA (2015) and the China-Australia FTA (2015) are in 
accordance with the ISDS in third generation Chinese BITs. Due to the limited scope of this research, 
China’s FTAs with investment provisions will not be further discussed. China FTA Network, China’s 
Free Trade Agreements, available at: http://fta.mofco m.gov.cn/engli sh/fta_qians hu.shtml (accessed 23 
September 2020).
3 In principle, Chinese BITs are divided into either three or four generations, and the time span for 
each generation is defined differently by various scholars. For instance, Congyan Cai has divided Chi-
nese BITs into three generations, namely the Conservative Paradigm (1982–1998); the Liberal Paradigm 
(1998–2005); and the Balanced Paradigm (2006–). See Cai (2009), pp. 461–462.
 Manjiao Chi opines that the first generation includes BITs concluded before the late 1990s, the second 
generation includes BITs concluded after the late 1990s and before the 2010s, and the third generation 
includes BITs concluded after the 2010s. See Chi (2017), p. 163.
 Axel Berger has divided Chinese BITs into four generations. The first phase was from 1982 until the 
end of the 1980s. The second phase was from the early 1990s to the late 1990s. The third phase was from 
1998 to 2008. And the fourth phase started from 2008 up until today. See Berger (2015), pp. 844–845.
 Matthew Levine divides Chinese international investment agreements (IIAs) into four generations. First 
generation of IIAs was concluded from 1982 to 1989 with developed and capital-exporting states, con-
taining narrow dispute settlement clauses. Second generation of IIAs was concluded from 1989 until the 
late 1990s, which retains continuity with the first generation but was negotiated with developing states. 
Third generation of IIAs was concluded with both developed and developing states that includes rela-
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a salient component of Chinese BITs. In this article, we define three generations 
of Chinese BITs based on the scope of consent to arbitration in ISDS provisions. 
The first generation Chinese BITs were signed from 1982 to 1999 (see Appendix 
Table  2), during which period China concluded BITs both with capital-exporting 
developed countries to attract inward foreign direct investment (FDI), and with cap-
ital-importing developing countries to promote China’s outward FDI. These BITs 
provide either no ISDS provisions at all or a narrowly constructed ISDS clause that 
only admits ‘the amount of compensation for expropriation’ to arbitration. ISDS pro-
visions in second generation Chinese BITs signed from 1997 to 2011 (see Appendix 
Table 3) are characterized by the abandonment of restricted admissibility in the pre-
vious generation and instead allow for the admission of legal disputes, or disputes in 
connection with an investment, or a combination of both, to arbitration. Calibrated 
to strike a balance between investment protection and the host state’s right to regu-
late, third generation Chinese BITs since 2007 (see Appendix Table 4) incorporate 
ISDS provisions that admit disputes where an investor or its investment has incurred 
loss or damage by reason of or arising from breaches of specific treaty obligations 
that are explicitly enumerated.
The evolutional trajectory of Chinese BITs creates several challenges. First, the 
complexity and diversity of the ISDS provisions in three generations of Chinese 
BITs result in the fragmentation of ISDS provisions. Further, the linguistic ambigu-
ity of ISDS provisions has created inconsistency in investment dispute adjudication. 
For instance, while first generation Chinese BITs only admit ‘the amount of com-
pensation for expropriation’ for arbitration, inconsistent interpretations of identical 
clauses based on different interpretative techniques and opposite decisions have been 
adopted by four arbitral tribunals and two national courts.4 Third, in the context of 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese investors and their outbound investment 
may suffer from a lack of access, or insufficient access to the ISDS mechanism due 
to the fact that the majority of BRI countries have either no BITs or first generation 
BITs with China.
In recent years, China has been active in modernizing its BIT regime. China is 
in the process of negotiating a BIT with the EU and the US respectively, which is 
expected to inaugurate a fourth generation of BITs once they are concluded. Fur-
ther, China has upgraded its BIT regime on a case-by-case basis by adopting four 
different models, and has actively promoted Chinese institutions to resolve investor-
state disputes. China is also an active participant in the ongoing discussion on ISDS 
reform under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law Working Group III (UNCITRAL WG III), by proposing a multilateral appeal 
4 For a detailed discussion of these cases, see infra Sect. 2.
tively broad dispute settlement clauses and guarantees of national treatment from the late 1990s to 2008. 
And fourth generation of IIAs began in 2008 which emphasizes regionalization, the conclusion of prefer-
ential trade and investment agreements, and interpretative and substantive balancing mechanisms in the 
investment treaty provisions. See Levine (2019).
Footnote 3 (continued)
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mechanism. These efforts and measures, however, may come with various limita-
tions, shortcomings, and trade-offs.
The purpose of this article is to elaborate on the commonalities and disparities of 
ISDS provisions by mapping three generations of Chinese BITs, presenting the chal-
lenges that ISDS provisions have brought to light in investor-state adjudication as 
well as in the context of the BRI, and expounding on China’s policy options in ISDS 
reform. After this introductory section this article proceeds as follows. Section  2 
discusses ISDS in first generation Chinese BITs, including a comprehensive exami-
nation of these ISDS provisions concerning their contracting states, amicable set-
tlement, admissible disputes, the venue of arbitration, the exhaustion of local rem-
edies, the fork-in-the-road provision, and the governing laws. Following the same 
structure and purpose as Sect. 2. Sects. 3 and 4 discuss the ISDS provisions in sec-
ond and third generation Chinese BITs respectively. Section 5 examines the ongo-
ing China–EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) and the China–US 
BIT negotiations as an emerging fourth generation Chinese BIT in the making. Sec-
tion 6 discusses two approaches China has adopted to facilitate dispute resolution 
in the BRI, as well as their respective shortfalls and limitations. Section 7 explores 
the possible options that China may choose in ISDS reform in the future, including 
China’s position at the UNCITRAL WG III. A conclusion is provided in Sect. 8.
2  ISDS in First Generation Chinese BITs (Circa. 1984–1999)
The largest number of Chinese BITs belong to the first generation (see Fig. 1).
The first eight pioneering BITs China entered into from 1982 to 1985 do not 
include ISDS provisions at all (see Appendix Table 2). China’s initial reluctance to 
consent to investor-state arbitration (ISA) is partially due to the fact that China had 
not yet become a signatory party to the International Center for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) Convention until February 1993.5 However, this does not 
mean that the pre-1993 BITs China has concluded are fully insulated from ISA. The 
first Chinese BIT that envisages ISDS clauses is the China–Belgian–Luxembourg 
Economic Union (BLEU) BIT concluded in 1984.6 Since then China entered into 
first generation BITs with ISDS provisions with the Netherlands in 1985 up until 
with Bahrain in 1999 (see Appendix Table 2).
First of all, the overwhelming majority of first generation Chinese BITs include 
the requirement of an amicable settlement of disputes through negotiation or consul-
tation for a maximum period of six months as a prerequisite for investors to resort 
5 China signed the ICSID Convention on 9 February 1990, ratified on 1 July 1992 and deposited the 
instrument of ratification on 7 January 1993. The ICSID Convention became effective for China on 6 
February 1993. ICSID, Membership, China, available at: https ://icsid .world bank.org/en/Pages /about /
Membe rship State Detai ls.aspx?state =ST30 (accessed 23 September 2020).
6 Art. 10 of the China-Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) BIT (1984) (Terminated and 
replaced by a renegotiated BIT in 2005).
507China’s Stance on Investor-State Dispute Settlement:…
123
to international arbitration.7 This is also known as the cooling-off period, during 
which the disputing parties may resort to amicable means in an attempt to resolve 
the dispute prior to resorting to ISA, including negotiation, conciliation or mediation 
(but excluding local administrative or judicial remedies).8 A few exceptions to this 
requirement can be found in 13 first generation Chinese BITs where no such a clause 
is provided, whereas in another five BITs either a longer or a shorter cooling-off 
period than the customary six-month one is stipulated (see Appendix Table 2).
Secondly, the ISDS provisions in first generation Chinese BITs include only the 
arbitrability of disputes concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation, 
although the formulation of these ISDS provisions is by no means consistent.9 In 
addition to a straightforward stipulation such as ‘disputes concerning the amount 
of compensation referred to in Article 4 (expropriation)’,10 some BITs also admit 
Number of first generation Chinese BITs
80
58%
Number of second generation Chinese BITs
46
33%
Number of third generation Chinese BITs
4
3%




Fig. 1  Numbers of three generations of Chinese BITs. Source obtained from UNCTAD, Investment 
Policy Hub, IIA Navigator, China, available at: http://inves tment polic yhub.uncta d.org/IIA/Count ryBit 
s/42#iiaIn nerMe nu (accessed 23 September 2020), and the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOF-
COM), Department of Treaty and Law, Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at: http://tfs.mofco m.gov.
cn/artic le/Nocat egory /20111 1/20111 10781 9474.shtml (accessed 23 September 2020). For a detailed 
mapping of ISDS in three generations of Chinese BITs, see Appendix Tables 2, 3 and 4 at the end of the 
article
8 Brauch (2017), p. 2.
9 Shan (2005), p. 200.
10 E.g. Art. 10.2 of the China-Greece BIT (1992).
7 For example, Arts. 9.1 and 9.2 of the China-Netherlands BIT (1985) (Terminated) stipulated that: ‘dis-
putes between one Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party concerning an invest-
ment […] shall, if possible, be settled amicably. If such disputes cannot be settled […] within a period 
of six months from the date either party requested amicable settlement […] the investor concerned may 
choose other means of resolution.’
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disputes concerning measures by the host state of an expropriating effect, such 
as ‘dispute involving the amount of compensation resulting from expropriation, 
nationalization, or other measures having an effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation’.11
This limited scope of ISDS did not radically change after China’s accession to the 
ICSID in 1993, as China retained its limited consent to ISA upon its ratification of 
the ICSID Convention by only adhering to the jurisdiction of the ICSID over com-
pensation resulting from expropriation or nationalization.12 In 88 first generation 
Chinese BITs, only 18 of them provide the ICSID as an optional venue for arbitra-
tion, whilst the remaining 70 provide either arbitration ad hoc or no specified arbi-
tration venue at all (see Appendix Table 2). The narrowly constructed scope of arbi-
tration clauses results in compromised effectiveness and unsatisfactory protection in 
terms of the ISDS mechanism.13 Nevertheless, it is deemed to be a rational outcome 
in the specific economic and political context. Being a capital-importing country at 
the time, China had little incentive to protect its overseas investment; instead, the 
limitation of investors’ access to ISDS was aimed at retaining the adjudicative pre-
rogatives within domestic courts in settling disputes with foreign investors.14
However, only an extremely rare proportion of first generation Chinese BITs 
require the exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition before recourse to 
international arbitration.15 The China–Poland BIT (1988) stipulates that ‘if an 
investor challenges the amount of compensation for the expropriated investment 
assets, he may file complaint with the competent authority of the Contracting 
Party taking the expropriatory measures. If it is not solved within one year after 
the complaint is filed, the competent court of the Contracting Party taking the 
expropriatory measures or an ad hoc international arbitral tribunal shall, upon 
the request of the investor, review the amount of compensation.’16 The same 
stipulation is included in the China–Malaysia BIT (1988) and the China–Paki-
stan BIT (1989).17 This means that under these three BITs, investment disputes 
regarding the amount of compensation for expropriation must first be referred 
11 E.g. Art. 13 of the China-Singapore BIT (1985).
12 China notified the ICSID on 7 January 1993 on its reservation to the ICSID Convention, stating that 
‘pursuant to Art. 25(4) of the Convention, the Chinese Government would only consider submitting to 
the jurisdiction of the ICSID disputes over compensation resulting from expropriation and nationaliza-
tion.’ ICSID, China,‘Notifications Concerning a Class or Classes of Disputes Which the Contracting 
State Would or Would Not Consider Submitting to the Jurisdiction of the Centre (Art. 25(4))’ (7 Janu-
ary 1993), available at: https ://icsid .world bank.org/en/Pages /about /Membe rship State Detai ls.aspx?state 
=ST30 (accessed 23 September 2020).
13 Schill (2007), p. 91.
14 Chi and Wang (2015), pp. 873–874.
15 The exhaustion of local remedies is a requirement in international investment agreements, which 
means whenever an investment dispute arises, a foreign investor must first pursue and essentially exhaust 
the local remedies in the host state, whether administrative, judicial or both, for a specific period, before 
that investor may initiate arbitration proceedings against the host state. See Brauch (2017), p. 2; Ameras-
inghe (2004), pp. 267–276.
16 Art. 10.1 of the China-Poland BIT (1988).
17 Art. 7(1) of the China-Malaysia BIT (1988); Art. 10 of the China-Pakistan BIT (1989).
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to a competent administrative authority as a prerequisite for subsequent judicial 
recourse in the host state or international arbitration. In another ten first genera-
tion Chinese BITs local remedies are provided only as a choice for investors at 
their own discretion instead of a mandatory prerequisite prior to international 
arbitration (see Appendix Table 2). In the remainder of first generation Chinese 
BITs, there is no mention of local remedies at all.
With regard to the fork-in-the-road provision, 41 first generation Chinese 
BITs include the fork-in-the-road provision, where the choice of an investor to 
submit the dispute to either a domestic court or to international arbitration is 
deemed final and exclusive with regard to either one or the other (see Appendix 
Table 2).
As to the applicable law, 46 first generation Chinese BITs refer to the follow-
ing sources: provisions of the BIT itself, the relevant domestic laws of both sig-
natory parties, other agreements that both signatory states have concluded, and 
the generally recognized principles of international law (see Appendix Table 2). 
Obviously, both the fork-in-the-road provision and the applicable law provision 
have been negotiated on a case-by-case basis without a noticeable pattern being 
followed.
So far there are eight known investment arbitration cases pertaining to first gen-
eration Chinese BITs: four of which involve Chinese (including one Hong Kong and 
one Macao) investors as Claimants;18 and four concern China as the Respondent.19 
18 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6; China Heilongjiang International 
Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp. et al. v. Mongolia, PCA Case No. 2010–20 (hereinafter China 
Heilongjiang v. Mongolia); Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/30; Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2013–13 (hereinafter Sanum v. Laos).
 In May 2019, two Chinese investors, Wuxi T. Hertz Technologies Co. Ltd. and Jetion Solar Co. Ltd., 
submitted a notice of arbitration to Greece to invoke arbitration under the China-Greece BIT (1992) con-
cerning a photovoltaic project in Northern Greece, based on an alleged delayed licence needed for the 
commencement of the project. In December 2019, it was reported that the Chinese investors had with-
drawn the notice of arbitration on the understanding that Greece would soon enact new legislation which 
would lead to the licensing of the project. IAReporter, ‘Chinese Solar Investors Withdraw Investment 
Treaty Arbitration Against Greece’ (3 December 2019), available at: https ://www.iarep orter .com/artic les/
chine se-solar -inves tors-withd raw-inves tment -treat y-arbit ratio n-again st-greec e/ (accessed 23 September 
2020).
19 Ekran Berhad v. China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15. The Tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction as 
the claim was time-barred.
 Macro Trading Co. Ltd. v. China, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/22. In June 2020, Macro Trading Co. Ltd., a 
Japanese investor in the construction sector, filed for arbitration against China based on the China-Japan 
BIT (1988), which contains first generation ISDS provisions. The case concerns disputes with regard to 
a real estate project in China, and is now in the process of appointing the remaining third arbitrator. Pre-
sumably, the contention of the case will be focused on either to adopt the narrow or broad interpretation 
of the ‘amount of compensation for expropriation’ in first generation Chinese BITs.
 Jason Yu Song v. China, PCA Case 2019–39. In 2019, the PCA administered an investment arbitration 
filed by Jason Yu Song, a UK national, against China, based on the China-UK BIT (1986), which contains 
first generation ISDS provisions. Very little information regarding the case has been disclosed so far.
 Goh Chin Soon v. China, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/34. Goh Chin Soon, a Singaporean businessman, 
initiated arbitration under the ICSID against China in September 2020, based on the China-Singapore 
BIT (1985) containing first generation ISDS provisions. It was reported that Goh had invested in several 
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The most debated controversy with respect to these cases relates to the interpretation 
of ‘disputes involving the amount of compensation for expropriation’. As a result, 
two schools of interpretation have been formed in investment adjudication. A broad 
view includes both the liability of expropriation (whether an expropriation act has 
taken place) and the quantification of compensation (the monetary amount to be 
compensated) as admissible disputes to arbitration, and a narrow view only admits 
the quantification of compensation to arbitration.
In Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, the Tribunal applied the ‘ordinary meaning’ approach 
to examine the semantic scope of the term ‘involving’ in Article 8(3) of the 
China–Peru BIT (1994).20 The Tribunal supported the broad view that the amount 
of compensation for expropriation includes ‘not only the mere determination of the 
amount but also any other issues normally inherent to an expropriation, including 
whether the property was actually expropriated in accordance with the BIT provi-
sions and requirements, as well as the determination of the amount of compensation 
due, if any’.21 When examining the Tza Yap Shum v. Peru case, a clearly expressed 
view is that a broad interpretation of the phrase ‘disputes involving the amount of 
compensation for expropriation’ is appropriate.22 Based on the narrow view, the 
investors would be allowed to resort to arbitration on the quantification of compen-
sation due only after a domestic court of the host state has first officially proclaimed 
the existence of the act of expropriation. Whereas according to Article 8(2) and 8(3) 
of the China–Peru BIT, namely the fork-in-the-road provision, once the investor 
submits the dispute to domestic adjudication, it loses its eligibility to resort to inter-
national arbitration.23 Therefore, a narrow interpretation of ‘the amount of compen-
sation for expropriation’ would result in the non-applicability of such an arbitration 
clause ipso jure.24 The Tribunal’s broad view in Tza Yap Shum v. Peru ‘effectively 
activates the practical utility’ of the arbitration clause in first generation BITs, ‘even 
though the Award does not have a precedential effect’.25
In contrast, one commentator argues that, as a Communist country, China 
believes that domestic courts instead of international arbitral tribunals should be the 
sole judge that retains the authority to determine the ownership of property within 
China.26 Hence, China’s original intention in negotiating first generation BITs was 
20 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Competence, 19 June 2009, para. 151.
21 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Award, 7 July 2011, para. 188.
22 Shen (2011), p. 77.
23 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Competence, 19 June 2009, para. 187.
24 Reinisch (2011), p. 173.
25 Shen (2011), p. 94.
26 Willems (2011), p. 3.
Footnote 19 (continued)
real estate development projects in Qingdao City in the 1990s, allegedly worth over 1.5 billion USD, all 
of which were unlawfully expropriated by the local government. Lisa Bohmer, ‘Singaporean Real Estate 
Developer Launches Treaty-based Arbitration against China’ (IAReporter, 17 September 2020), available 
at: https ://www-iarep orter -com.eur.idm.oclc.org/artic les/singa porea n-real-estat e-devel oper-launc hes-treat 
y-based -arbit ratio n-again st-china / (accessed 23 September 2020).
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to adopt a narrow interpretation thereof, and the issue of the amount of compensa-
tion to be paid was only admissible to arbitration after a Chinese court had recog-
nized the fact that there had been an act of expropriation, either lawful or unlawful, 
in the first place.27
In Sanum v. Laos, the Laotian government challenged the jurisdiction of the Tri-
bunal by relying on, inter alia, the argument that Article 8(3) of the China–Laos 
BIT (1993) only permitted arbitration of ‘a dispute involving the amount of compen-
sation for expropriation’ and not ‘disputes involving expropriation’.28 The Tribunal 
looked at the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘involving’, noted that ‘it is also con-
sistent with how a similar provision was interpreted by the Tza Yap Shum Tribunal’, 
made a broad interpretation, and decided that it had jurisdiction because ‘involving’ 
should be interpreted as an inclusive term (and equal to ‘including’) rather than an 
exclusive one.29 The Laotian government then filed to vacate the Award on Juris-
diction for the Tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction before the High Court in Singapore 
(SGHC), the seat of arbitration, which then supported Laos and annulled the Award, 
based on the principal reasoning that the Macau-incorporated Sanum did not qualify 
as an investor under the China–Laos BIT.30 SGHC also interpreted Article 8(3) of 
the China–Laos BIT, and came to a narrow interpretation of the term ‘amount of 
compensation for expropriation’. The Judge placed strong emphasis on the context of 
the treaty and its historical background of negotiation, and relied on an assumption 
that two Communist states at the time of negotiation were more likely to intend for 
a restrictive arbitration clause in the China–Laos BIT in order to prioritize national 
judicial power in resolving investment disputes.31 This line of interpretation by the 
SGHC has been criticized as problematic, unnecessary and superfluous, because the 
Judge placed strong emphasis on the context of the treaty and its negotiating back-
ground in coming to his decision, but was neglectful of the object and purpose of the 
treaty in promoting foreign investment and protecting foreign investors.32
Sanum later appealed to the Singapore Court of Appeal (SGCA), which reversed 
the High Court’s judgment and sustained the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, in support 
of an expansive interpretation of Article 8(3).33 The SGCA adopted the ‘context, 
object and purpose’ technique, as well as the principle of effet utile, to interpret Arti-
cle 8(3), and argued that the fork-in-the-road provision in the China–Laos BIT, if 
under the narrow interpretation of the ‘amount of compensation for expropriation’, 
would bar investors from bringing a dispute to arbitration.34 Because once an inves-
tor submits the dispute on expropriation and any issues relating to it to a domestic 
27 Rooney (2007), p. 703.
28 Sanum v. Laos, Award on Jurisdiction, 13 December 2013, para. 145.
29 Ibid., para. 329.
30 Lao Republic v. Sanum, High Court of Singapore, [2015] SGHC 15, Judgement, 20 January 2015, 
para. 111.
31 Ibid., paras. 123–126.
32 Hwang and Chang (2015), p. 522.
33 Sanum v. Lao Republic, Court of Appeal of Singapore, [2016] SGCA 57, Judgement, 29 September 
2016, para. 150.
34 Ibid., paras. 130–133.
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court of the host state, the fork-in-the-road provision will prevent the investor from 
submitting the same issues to arbitration. The SGCA’s reliance on the fork-in-the-
road provision to support a broad interpretation of the ‘amount of compensation for 
expropriation’ has been appraised as a ‘meticulous examination’ of the issue, and 
an ‘influential and prominent’ decision to ‘avoid an illusory right to arbitration’ to 
investors.35 The limitation of the SGCA’s interpretative approach, however, is that it 
cannot be applicable to first generation Chinese BITs with no fork-in-the-road pro-
visions in place. After the confirmation of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Tribunal 
decided in favour of Laos on the grounds of Sanum’s bribery and bad faith in the 
operation of its investment and unfounded expropriation claims.36
In Beijing Urban Construction Group (BUCG) v. Yemen, the Tribunal concluded 
that the ‘ordinary meaning’ and scope of the text ‘amount of compensation for 
expropriation’ were not conclusive to reach either a narrow or broad reading thereof, 
and that the Tribunal had to move to the ‘context, object and purpose’ of the treaty.37 
The Tribunal adopted a broad interpretation, by taking the view that ‘the Contract-
ing Parties intended to confer a real choice, not an illusory choice, on investors from 
their respective countries, and that the words “relating to the amount of compen-
sation for expropriation” must, in context, be read to include disputes relating to 
whether or not an expropriation has occurred.’38
In China Heilongjiang International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp. 
et al. v. Mongolia, the Tribunal viewed the plain meaning of ‘involving’ in Article 
8(3) of the China–Mongolia BIT (1991) as a neutral one and could neither support 
a broad or a narrow interpretation.39 Moving to the ‘context, object and purpose’ 
of the treaty, the Tribunal rendered its Award, deciding on its lack of jurisdiction 
ratione materiae, as a narrow approach in interpreting Article 8(3) was adopted.40 
The Tribunal took the view that ‘a dispute involving the amount of compensation for 
expropriation’ only ‘describes a particular category of disputes’, namely ‘whether 
the compensation which is due […] is equivalent to the value of the expropriated 
investments’ after an expropriation act has formally been proclaimed by the host 
state, ‘the occurrence of which is not contested’.41 Therefore, the claimants’ request 
to the Tribunal to first adjudicate whether Mongolia had expropriated the Claimants’ 
investment fell outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The decision in China Hei-
longjiang v. Mongolia marks a turning point in the adjudication of first generation 
Chinese BITs, as it is the first arbitration case where the Tribunal has adopted a nar-
row interpretation. Yet the issue of the narrow or broad interpretation of first genera-
tion Chinese BITs remains a subject of debate.42 In September 2017, the claimants 
35 Hwang and Chang (2018), p. 180.
36 Sanum v. Laos, Award, 6 August 2019.
37 Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, 31 May 2017, para. 77.
38 Ibid., para. 87.
39 China Heilongjiang v. Mongolia, PCA Case No. 2010–20, Award, 30 June 2017, para. 446.
40 Ibid., para. 452.
41 Ibid., paras. 445, 448.
42 Scharaw (2018), pp. 305–306.
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filed a Petition to the New York Southern District Court to annul the Award.43 The 
Court’s order in 2019 confirmed the validity of the Award, stating that ‘the Chi-
nese companies, by initiating this arbitration, affirmatively arguing for the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, and vigorously participating in the seven-year-long arbitration proceed-
ings, have waived their opportunity to object now to the arbitrators’ ability to decide 
the arbitrability of the case. The Court therefore finds that the parties clearly and 
unmistakably agreed to place the question of arbitrability before the tribunal.’44 The 
Court thus refrained from expressing any opinions on the accuracy of the Tribunal’s 
analysis of the dispute.
The above four cases demonstrate how the identical wording ‘disputes involving 
the amount of compensation for expropriation’ in first generation Chinese BITs cre-
ates interpretative ambiguities and inconsistency in jurisprudence. In Tza Yap Shum 
v. Peru, Sanum v. Laos, and BUCG v. Yemen, the Tribunals supported a broad inter-
pretation, whereas in China Heilongjiang v. Mongolia, the Tribunal decided other-
wise. All four Tribunals claimed to adhere to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in terms of their interpretative techniques, namely, 
to interpret treaty provisions ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose’, but emphasized different aspects and came to divergent conclusions. 
In Tza Yap Shum v. Peru and Sanum v. Laos, both Tribunals relied on the ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘involving’ to reach a broad view, whilst in BUCG v. Yemen 
and China Heilongjiang v. Mongolia, both Tribunals moved to the ‘context, object 
and purpose’ of the treaty, but the former adopted a broad view and the latter a nar-
row view. The inconsistency of adjudicating techniques and outcomes delivered by 
arbitral tribunals is further exacerbated by domestic courts. In Sanum v. Laos, the 
SGHC endorsed a narrow view, which was later overturned by the SGCA in support 
of a broad view, and confirmed the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Whereas the New 
York Southern District Court confirmed the Tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction on the 
ground of arbitrability.
Because of the lack of a prevailing or authoritative interpretation in adjudicating 
practice, and the fact that an interpretation given by any tribunals or national courts 
does not have a binding precedential effect for pending or future cases, first gen-
eration Chinese BITs cannot ‘guarantee a formalistic, formulaic or recitative inter-
pretation’.45 The inconsistency problem emanated in the adjudication manifests the 
inherent drawback of the current ad hoc investor-state arbitration mechanism. This 
creates uncertainty and a great potential for more inconsistent outcomes in future 
arbitration cases when first generation Chinese BITs are involved, inter alia in the 
three new pending cases where China is the Respondent.46
43 Beijing Shougang Mining Investment Company, Ltd. et al. v. Mongolia, No. 1:2017cv07436—Docu-
ment 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
44 Beijing Shougang Mining Investment Company, Ltd. et al. v. Mongolia, No. 1:2017cv07436—Docu-
ment 21 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), p. 1.
45 Shen (2011), p. 94.
46 These three cases refer to Macro Trading Co. Ltd. v. China, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/22; Jason Yu 
Song v. China, PCA Case 2019–39; and Goh Chin Soon v. China, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/34. See 
above n. 19.
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3  ISDS in Second Generation Chinese BITs (Circa. 1997–2011)
The second generation Chinese BITs incorporate ISDS clauses with a broad scope, 
representing an amicable shift towards the elimination of the admissibility hurdle 
against investors in the past.47 It starts with the China–South Africa BIT in Decem-
ber 1997, which stipulates that any dispute between an investor of one contract-
ing Party and the other Contracting Party in connection with an investment is eli-
gible to be resolved by international arbitration.48 The next second generation BIT 
China signed is the China–Barbados BIT (1998), which stipulates that ‘any dispute 
concerning an investment between an investor of one Contracting Party and the 
other Contracting Party’ is admissible to investment arbitration.49 Article 9 of the 
China–Barbados BIT has since then become exemplary for later second generation 
Chinese BITs.
Featured with the abandonment of restrictive arbitration clauses in previous 
BITs and the adoption of an extended and liberalized consent to international arbi-
tration, as many as 46 Chinese BITs belong to the second generation (see Appen-
dix Table 3). 24 of them have provided that any investment dispute can be brought 
to international arbitration, which is referred to as the ‘investment requirement’ 
(see Appendix Table 3). The scope and meaning of ‘investment’ are subsequently 
referred to in the investment definition clause in the same BIT.50 Furthermore, six 
second generation Chinese BITs stipulate that any legal dispute between an investor 
of one contracting party and the other contracting party is admissible to investment 
arbitration, starting from the China–Congo BIT (2000), which is referred to as the 
‘legal requirement’.51 In addition, seven second generation Chinese BITs combine 
the ‘legal requirement’ and the ‘investment requirement’, meaning that any legal 
47 Chi and Wang (2015), p. 884.
48 Arts. 9.1 and 9.2 of the China-South Africa BIT (1997).
49 Art. 9 of the China-Barbados BIT (1998).
50 Such an ‘investment requirement’ in second generation Chinese BITs might also invoke controversy 
with regard to the approaches in applying the term. In ISDS jurisprudence, several tribunals have grap-
pled with the phrase ‘any dispute in connection with an investment’, and reached divergent interpre-
tations thereof. E.g., in Salini et  al. v. Morocco, the Tribunal made an expansive interpretation of the 
phrase, allowing for its jurisdiction not only over disputes arising out of a treaty violation, but also con-
tractual claims made by the investor. To the contrary, in SGS v. Pakistan, the Tribunal took a restrictive 
approach by interpreting the formulation of ‘disputes with respect to investments’ in a strictly descriptive 
way, thus dismissing all contractual disputes claimed by the investor. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and 
Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 
2001, para. 61; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 161.
51 Due to the lack of any further definitions in second generation Chinese BITs, the term ‘legal dispute’ 
might be subject to interpretation by other sources of international law. In a general understanding, the 
legal requirement may be explained to exclude certain disputes such as moral, political, or purely con-
tractual claims made by investors. See Shen (2010), p. 403.
 In Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, the Tribunal addressed the ‘legal’ nature of an admissible dispute, and 
developed a relatively clear standard, asserting that the legal dispute should concern ‘the existence or 
scope of legal rights’, or ‘the nature and extent of the relief to be granted as a result of the alleged viola-
tion of those legal rights’. Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 March 2007, para. 95.
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dispute in connection with an investment is admissible to international arbitration 
(see Appendix Table 3).52 Despite the miscellaneous wording that they adopt, it is 
certain that all three types of formulation of the consent clause in second generation 
Chinese BITs are broad in nature.
The stipulation of the exhaustion of local remedies in second generation Chi-
nese BITs is introduced by the China–South Africa BIT (1997). Article 9.2 of this 
BIT stipulates that ‘if the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations within six 
months, either Party to the dispute shall be entitled to submit the dispute to an inter-
national arbitral tribunal provided that the Contracting Party involved in the dispute 
may [emphasis added] require the investor to initiate administrative review proce-
dures in accordance with its laws and regulations.’53 The same stipulation is observed 
in another 17 second generation Chinese BITs (see Appendix Table 3). This means 
that in these 18 second generation Chinese BITs, the requirement of the exhaustion 
of local remedies before recourse to arbitration is optional at the discretion of the host 
state. The wording ‘may’ indicates that the exhaustion of an administrative review 
procedure is not a treaty requirement established by the BIT at issue, but only a pos-
sible request by the host state. Yet, in a further four second generation Chinese BITs, 
starting with the China–Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2002), the requirement of the exhaustion 
of an administrative review procedure prior to international arbitration is obligatory 
(see Appendix Table 3). Article 9.3. of the China–Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2002) stipu-
lates that ‘if dispute cannot be settled amicably through negotiations, any legal dis-
pute between an investor […] and the other Contracting Party in connection with an 
investment […] shall [emphasis added] exhaust the domestic administrative review 
procedure specified by the laws and regulations of that Contracting Party, before the 
submission of the dispute aforementioned to an arbitration procedure.’54 For the rest 
of second generation Chinese BITs, no such provisions are provided.
In addition, 29 second generation Chinese BITs provide a conventional fork-in-
the-road clause, whereas starting with the China–Latvia BIT (2004), four of them 
provide fork-in-the-road provisions that also allow a reversal to international arbi-
tration under certain circumstances.55 A fork-in-the-road provision means once an 
investor has submitted the dispute either to a competent domestic court or to ISA, 
the choice of one of the two procedures shall be final. Whereas conditional reversal 
refers to the situation when an investor who has submitted the dispute to a national 
court may nevertheless have recourse to investment arbitration, if the investor has 
withdrawn the case from the national court before any judgment has been delivered 
on the subject matter. The emergence of the fork-in-the-road provision with condi-
tional reversal in second generation Chinese BITs marks a critical transition from 
the first generation Chinese BITs, as it could result in a greater freedom of choice 
52 E.g. Art. 9.1 of the China-Myanmar BIT (2001) stipulates that ‘any legal dispute between an investor 
of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party in connection with an investment in the terri-
tory of the other Contracting Party […]’ shall be admissible to international arbitration.
53 China-South Africa BIT (1997).
54 Art. 9.3 of the China-Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2002).
55 Art. 9.2 of the China-Latvia BIT (2004); Art. 9.3 of the China-Finland BIT (2004); Art. 9.4 of the 
China-Slovakia Additional Protocol (2005); Art. 11.4 of the China-Switzerland BIT (2009).
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between national courts and international arbitration by foreign investors, and pro-
mote, in theory, the rule of law in the domestic judicial system ‘by exposing national 
courts to competition with and scrutiny by international arbitration tribunals’.56
With regard to the applicable law, 29 out of 46 second generation Chinese BITs 
contain the governing law by which the arbitral tribunal shall abide during adjudica-
tion. In comparison with the first generation Chinese BITs where the governing law 
includes the domestic laws of both signatory parties, the governing law in second 
generation Chinese BITs refers only to the domestic law of the host state, including 
its rules on the conflict of laws, in addition to the provisions of the BIT at issue and 
the applicable principles of international law.57
In comparison with the narrowly constructed ISDS provisions in first generation 
Chinese BITs, second generation Chinese BITs have resulted in a much broader cov-
erage of access to international arbitration. Such a drastic policy shift is attributed to 
a synergy of economic, geo-political and historical factors. One of the most signifi-
cant reasons for this shift is that China has attempted to protect its outbound invest-
ment ‘without much probability of being involved as a respondent in any investor-
state dispute’, as China has gradually started to become a capital-exporting country 
investing in developing countries.58 As a matter of fact, out of the 46 second genera-
tion Chinese BITs, 37 signatory states are developing countries located in Africa, 
South East Asia and Latin America, which are commonly considered as capital-
importing countries (see Appendix Table 3). The liberal ISDS provisions aim to pro-
vide more potent protection to Chinese outbound investment against risks abroad 
due to unforeseeable host governments’ intervention in business activities.59
There are three arbitration cases involving second generation Chinese BITs: Ping 
An Insurance Company v. Belgium lodged in 2012,60 Ansung Housing v. China 
lodged in 2014,61 and Hela Schwarz GmbH v. China lodged in 2017.62
56 Hadley (2013), p. 305.
57 E.g., Art. 9.6 of the China-Barbados BIT (1998) stipulates that ‘the arbitral tribunal shall decide the 
issues in dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, the law of the Contracting Party 
accepting the investment and applicable rules of international law’.
58 Cai (2006), p. 646.
59 Schill (2007), p. 76.
60 Ping An Life Insurance Company, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company, Limited v. The 
Government of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29 (hereinafter Ping An v. Belgium).
61 Ansung Housing Co. Ltd. v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25. The claim arose 
out of China’s provincial government’s alleged actions (a refusal to sell additional land to Ansung to 
complete its project already under construction) in respect of Ansung’s investment in building a golf club 
in China. Ansung filed a request for ICSID arbitration in 2014 under the China-South Korea BIT (2007). 
The Tribunal ruled in the host state’s favour, on the ground that the claim was rendered time-barred, 
according to the three-year limitation period stipulated in the BIT.
62 Hela Schwarz GmbH v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/19. In May 2017 Hela 
Schwarz GmbH, a German spice and food additive manufacturer, brought a claim to the ICSID against 
China under the China-Germany BIT (2003). The Claimant objected that an illegitimate expropriation 
was carried out against it by the local government and the compensation amount was largely underval-
ued, invoking a breach of Art. 9 of the China-Germany BIT on Expropriation and Compensation. The 
Tribunal was constituted in January 2018, and the case is still pending.
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When a newly negotiated second generation Chinese BIT replaces its preceding 
first generation, a transition clause that specifies the temporal jurisdiction of two 
successive BITs is usually in place. The semantic scope of the transition clause, 
as demonstrated in the Ping An v. Belgium case, remains a central issue. This case 
concerns two BITs, namely the China–BLEU BIT (1984), which came into force in 
1986, featuring a first generation ISDS clause, and the China–BLEU BIT (2005), 
which came into force in 2009, replacing the 1984 BIT and featuring a second gen-
eration ISDS clause.63 The Claimants filed a claim with the ICSID against Belgium 
in 2012, according to the arbitration clause of the 2005 BIT,64 but all substantive 
claims were made based on the obligations under the 1984 BIT.65 The Tribunal 
first observed that it was ‘unequivocal’ that the dispute arose before 2009, when the 
2005 BIT came into force.66 The Tribunal then interpreted Article 8(1) of the 2005 
BIT according to its ‘plain meaning’,67 and found that it was only applicable to dis-
putes which only ‘arise’ after 2009, the time of the entry into force of the 2005 BIT, 
because the wording ‘arises’ cannot be interpreted as having the same meaning as 
‘arises or has arisen’.68
The Claimant also relied on paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the 2005 BIT, namely 
the Transition Clause, to assert the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute. Para-
graph 2 stipulates that:
The present Agreement shall apply to all investments [emphasis added] made 
by investors of either Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contract-
ing Party, whether made before or after the entry into force of this Agreement, 
but [emphasis added] shall not apply to any dispute [emphasis added] or any 
claim concerning an investment which was already under judicial or arbitral 
process before its entry into force. Such disputes and claims shall continue to 
be settled according to the provisions of the Agreement of 1984 mentioned in 
paragraph 1 of this Article.
The transition clause makes clear that the 2005 BIT does not cover disputes 
which arose and were already under judicial or arbitral process before 2009, the time 
of the entry into force of the 2005 BIT. The point of contention was whether the 
63 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Belgian-Luxembourg 
Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (Terminated) (signed on 4 
June 1984, effective on 5 October 1986). Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (signed on 6 June 2005, effective on 1 December 2009).
64 Ping An v. Belgium, Award, 30 April 2015, para. 7.
65 Ibid., para. 85.
66 Ibid., para. 205.
67 Art. 8(1) of the China-BLEU BIT (2005) is headed ‘settlement of investment disputes’ and provides 
that: ‘When a legal dispute arises [emphasis added] between an investor of one Contracting Party and the 
other Contracting Party, either party to the dispute shall notify the other party to the dispute in writing. 
As far as possible, the parties to the dispute shall endeavor to settle the dispute through consultations, if 
necessary by seeking expert advice from a third party, or by conciliation between the Contracting Parties 
through diplomatic channels.’
68 Ping An v. Belgium, Award, 30 April 2015, para. 224.
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transition clause of the 2005 BIT covers disputes which arose, but were not under 
judicial or arbitral process, before the entry into force of the 2005 BIT, such as the 
dispute in Ping An v. Belgium. The Tribunal took the view that the 2005 BIT does 
not expressly deal with such a dispute in contention, because paragraph 2 of Article 
10 of the 2005 BIT only expressly covers investments made before or after the entry 
into force of the 2005 BIT, but not disputes arising out of those investments. To infer 
that ‘investments’ also implicitly include ‘disputes arising out of such investments’ 
would be a ‘creative interpretation’ and a gap which the Tribunal refused to fill.69 
Consequently, the Tribunal decided on the lack of jurisdiction.
The Tribunal’s interpretation received mixed reviews. A critical opinion on the Ping 
An v. Belgium Award is that the use of the adversative conjunction but in paragraph 2 
of Article 10 of the 2005 BIT indicates that investments should also cover disputes con-
cerning these investments.70 However, the Tribunal read ‘investments’ and ‘dispute’ in 
isolation, instead of as ‘integral parts of one single sentence’.71 The Tribunal’s approach 
in interpreting the 2005 BIT is problematic because it is doubtful whether the Tribu-
nal actually complied with its avowed approach, where the Tribunal claimed to interpret 
Article 10 of the 2005 BIT ‘in good faith’ as required by Article 31 of the VCLT, and to 
‘not consider that a narrow and purely linguistic exercise is appropriate’.72 In contrast, a 
supportive opinion concerning the Tribunal’s approach argues that the Tribunal’s juris-
diction should only be based on ‘the regular means of treaty interpretation’, but not ‘be 
presumed absent a clear text to that effect’.73 The Tribunal therefore ‘provided a solid 
reasoning’ and ‘justified its choices’.74 It appears that either opinion accords with the 
principles of treaty interpretation in Article 31 VCLT, and cannot triumph over the other. 
The unresolved debate over the transition clause in Ping An v. Belgium raises concerns 
about uncertainty and inconsistency in future investor-state disputes regarding the tem-
poral jurisdiction of successive Chinese BITs.
4  ISDS in Third Generation Chinese BITs (Circa. 2007–2013)
Since 2007, the coherence of second generation Chinese BITs has become less distinct, 
accompanied by the sporadic occurrence of a new modality of ISDS provisions. China 
started to deviate from the traditional lean European model of BIT-making, as followed 
by older generation Chinese BITs, and gravitated towards the US model that is more 
comprehensive and elaborate.75 It is believed that this policy shift ‘is part of a greater 
move in the international investment regime to reformulate international investment 
69 Ibid., para. 225.
70 Ren (2016), p. 133.
71 Ibid., p. 133.
72 Ibid., pp. 132–133.
73 De Brabandere and Lemeire (2017), para. 21.
74 Ibid., para. 22.
75 Some scholars have referred to this shift as one ‘from Europeanization toward Americanization’. See, 
Chi (2017). In some scholarly references, the word Americanization is also interchangeably used with 
‘NAFTA-ization’ or ‘Westernization’. See Berger (2013b); Ji (2011).
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agreement (IIA) approaches aiming to recalibrate the relationship between the level of 
protection for foreign investors and the policy space of host country governments.’76
The modified BIT with Cuba in 2007 marks the pioneer of third generation Chi-
nese BITs. However, China later concluded BITs with Columbia, Switzerland, Mali, 
Malta and Uzbekistan respectively from 2008 to 2011, all of which still belong to the 
second generation (see Appendix Table 3). It is the conclusion of the China–Can-
ada BIT signed in 2012 that epitomizes third generation Chinese BITs. Until the 
China–Tanzania BIT signed in 2013, which is the latest BIT that China has con-
cluded, four Chinese BITs belong to the third generation (see Appendix Table 4).
For a start, one of the most noticeable traits of third generation Chinese BITs is 
the expansion of provisions on dispute settlement. Instead of ‘ISDS provisions’ that 
account for several clauses at best, third generation Chinese BITs usually feature 
designated dispute settlement chapters that contain elaborated articles. For instance, 
the China–Mexico BIT (2008) includes a whole chapter with as many as 17 articles 
specifically addressing ISDS, and the China–Canada BIT (2012) establishes a part 
that includes 13 ISDS articles.77 Third generation Chinese BITs ‘seem to indicate 
China is willing to negotiate detailed and highly prescriptive dispute resolution pro-
visions’.78 In comparison, the dispute settlement section in the US Model BIT 2012 
comprises 14 articles, constituting one third of the whole text.79 This demonstrates 
the paradigm shift China takes in negotiating BITs that becomes analogous to the 
elaborated US model.
Second, third generation Chinese BITs require the amicable settlement of dis-
putes in a cooling-off period of six months (four months in the China–Canada BIT) 
before resorting to arbitration, starting from the date of the investor’s submission of 
notification of intent to arbitration.80 An investor is obliged to first submit a notifica-
tion of intent to arbitration to the host state regarding the fundamental issues as well 
as the factual and legal basis of the claim, in order to give the host state a ‘heads up’ 
before the host state responds in the arbitration proceedings, and to avoid frivolous 
arbitration or claims with no legal merit. Such a stipulation originates from the 2004 
US model BIT, where a notice of intent to the host state is required at least 90 days 
before filing a claim to arbitration.81
Third, this generation of Chinese BITs admit an investment dispute to interna-
tional arbitration where an investor or its investment has incurred loss or damage by 
76 Berger (2015), p. 850.
77 Chapter III of the China-Mexico BIT (2008); Part C of the China-Canada BIT (2012).
78 Gallagher (2016), p. 103.
79 USTR, Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Section B (2012), 
available at: https ://ustr.gov/sites /defau lt/files /BIT%20tex t%20for %20ACI EP%20Mee ting.pdf (accessed 
23 September 2020) (hereinafter US Model BIT 2012). USTR, Treaty between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Recip-
rocal Protection of Investment, Section B (2004), available at: https ://www.state .gov/docum ents/organ 
izati on/11760 1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2020) (hereinafter US Model BIT 2004).
80 Art. 9.3.1 of the China-Cuba BIT (2007); Art. 12 of the China-Mexico BIT (2008); Art. 21 of the 
China-Canada BIT (2012).
81 Art. 24.2 of the US Model BIT 2004. See also Caplan and Sharpe (2013), p. 826.
520 Y. Li, C. Bian 
123
reason of or arising from breaches of obligations under the applicable BIT.82 Third 
generation Chinese BITs further stipulate that only breaches of specific obligations 
under the BIT concerned are admissible to arbitration; admissible disputes are posi-
tively listed and are therein ‘article specific’.83 For instance, the China–Canada BIT 
only admits investment disputes to arbitration concerning breaches of specific pro-
visions of the BIT which cause a loss or damage to the investor in relation to its 
investment.84 This means that third generation Chinese BITs demand a combination 
of a breach of article-specific treaty obligations and the requirement of actual dam-
age therefrom, which consequently establishes a higher threshold of admissibility 
to ISA. Once again, this approach can be traced back to the same stipulations in the 
2004 US Model BIT.85
Fourth, third generation Chinese BITs appear to be more selective in terms of 
the scope of consent to arbitration, as certain exclusions to ISDS are explicitly pre-
scribed, in addition to the aforementioned admissibility requirements. For instance, 
the China–Canada BIT includes a ‘negative list’, in which specific provisions in the 
treaty are explicitly excluded from investor-state arbitration. In addition to the gen-
eral exceptions that do not apply to the treaty as a whole,86 the China–Canada BIT 
also explicitly excludes the application of ISDS to disputes concerning prudential 
measures in the financial sector, which may eventually be resolved by state-to-state 
arbitration.87 Disputes over taxation measures are also excluded from investor-state 
arbitration.88 Finally, a decision made by China or Canada under national laws and 
regulations regarding the approval of an investment, or a national security review, is 
excluded from investor-state arbitration.89 The ‘negative list’ approach is also a fea-
ture that first appeared in the US model BIT 2004.90
Fifth, the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment in third generation Chinese 
BITs is explicitly excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism.91 This means 
that foreign investors are not able to invoke the MFN clause in third generation Chi-
nese BITs to import a more favourable, or otherwise a less burdensome procedural 
82 Art. 13.1 of the China-Mexico BIT (2008); Art. 20.1 of the China-Canada BIT (2012); Art. 13.2 of 
the China-Tanzania BIT (2013).
83 Ibid.
84 Art. 20.1 of the China-Canada BIT (2012) stipulates that an investor may submit a claim to arbitration 
when the investor or its investment has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of breaches 
of obligations under Arts. 2 to 7(2), 9, 10 to 13, 14 (4) or 16 of the BIT.
85 Art. 24.1 of the US Model BIT 2004.
86 Art. 33 of the China-Canada BIT (2012) stipulates that the general exceptions which do not apply to 
the whole BIT include measures in respect of cultural industries, environmental measures, measures for 
prudential reasons in the financial sector, measures of monetary policies, information of essential secu-
rity interests or of confidentiality.
87 Art. 20 (2) of the China-Canada BIT (2012).
88 Art. 14 of the China-Canada BIT (2012).
89 Annex D.34 of the China-Canada BIT (2012).
90 Arts. 18–21 of the US Model BIT 2004.
91 E.g., para. 3, Art. 5 Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, of the China-Canada BIT (2012) stipulates that: 
‘for greater certainty, the “treatment” referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article does not encom-
pass the dispute resolution mechanisms, such as those in Part C, in other international investment treaties 
and other trade agreements’.
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treatment from other BITs of which China is a party. The contention of whether 
the MFN clause should be applicable to procedural aspects, such as admissibility to 
international arbitration so that a tribunal can establish its jurisdiction based on the 
application of the MFN clause, has been widely addressed in international invest-
ment arbitration. As a matter of fact, inconsistent decisions have been made in mul-
tiple cases where different tribunals have either explicitly confirmed or rejected the 
applicability of the MFN clause for procedural benefits, be it an exemption from 
procedural preconditions or an extension of jurisdiction in order to successfully 
invoke an arbitration. For instance, in Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Spain,92 and Gas 
Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentina,93 the Tribunals explicitly acknowledged the applica-
bility of the MFN clause for procedural benefits; whereas in Salini Costruttori S.p.A. 
and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Jordan,94 and Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria,95 the 
Tribunals explicitly rejected the application of the MFN clause to procedural mat-
ters.96 The interpretation of these Tribunals on whether the jurisdiction of a tribunal 
could be expanded by incorporating a more favourable treatment through the invoca-
tion of the MFN clause resulted in three schools: a definite ‘yes’ school, a definite 
‘no’ school and an ‘answer to the question cannot be formulated in general terms’ 
school.97 With the lack of clear jurisprudence, it is worrisome that the interpreta-
tion of the MFN clause may well largely depend on a tribunal’s own discretion on a 
case-by-case basis. In this context the third generation Chinese BITs provide a clear 
insulation from those ambiguities.
Sixth, the China–Mexico BIT and the China–Tanzania BIT provide fork-in-the-
road provisions, whereas the China–Cuba BIT and the China–Canada BIT adopt the 
‘no U-Turn’ clause that allows for a conditional retour: investors are allowed to have 
recourse to international arbitration even if the dispute has been submitted to domes-
tic courts, as long as the investor waives the right to continue any proceedings in a 
court of the host state before a final judgment has been made.98
Seventh, an important shift in third generation Chinese BITs with regard to the 
applicable law to which a tribunal shall resort in resolving a dispute is the exclusion 
of the domestic law of the contracting states. For example, the China–Mexico BIT 
explicitly stipulates that ‘a tribunal established […] shall decide the issues in dispute 
in accordance with this Agreement and with the applicable rules and principles of 
international law’.99 The China–Canada BIT made an identical stipulation to that 
92 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000.
93 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision on Prelimi-
nary Questions on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005.
94 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 9 November 2004.
95 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Juris-
diction, 8 February 2005.
96 The cases in the above nn. 92–95 are cited from Douglas (2011), p. 98.
97 Ibid.
98 Art. 9.4.1.d of the China-Cuba Modification Agreement (2007); Annex C.21 of the China-Canada 
BIT (2012).
99 Art. 27 of the China-Mexico BIT (2008).
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in the China–Mexico BIT.100 In comparison with the governing law stipulated in 
the first and second generations Chinese BITs, the domestic laws of both signatory 
states may no longer be referred to by arbitral tribunals under the China–Mexico 
BIT and China–Canada BIT. The inclusion of domestic law as the governing law 
or the applicable law in ISDS is a mechanism which allows the host state to invoke 
its own municipal law to justify state measures that allegedly violate its treaty obli-
gations.101 Hence, its exclusion would result in the elimination of the possibility 
of applying domestic laws and regulations as a defense in international investment 
arbitration.102
Last but not the least, the China–Canada BIT is so far the most comprehen-
sive and innovative investment agreement that China has concluded with a pro-
found significance, in terms of the formulations it adopts as well as the implica-
tions thereof.103 It provides that: to ensure the impartiality and professionalism of 
the arbitrators, the tribunal shall comprise of three arbitrators, who are subject to 
specific qualification requirements.104 And to increase the efficiency of the tribu-
nal, where two or more claims have been submitted separately to arbitration and the 
claims have a question of law or fact in common and arise out of the same events 
or circumstances, any disputing party may seek a consolidation order with the tri-
bunal.105 To increase the transparency of the arbitration proceedings, any tribunal 
award, hearings and relevant documents are publicly available, subject to the redac-
tion of confidential information.106 A tribunal may recommend an interim measure 
of protection to preserve the rights of a disputing party, or to ensure that the tribu-
nal’s jurisdiction is made fully effective, including a recommendation to preserve 
evidence in the possession or control of a disputing party.107 All of the above unique 
features in the China–Canada BIT are once again modelled upon respective clauses 
in the US Model BIT.108
Third generation Chinese BITs are prominent examples of how the Chinese gov-
ernment now seeks to negotiate ISDS chapters which strike a balance between the 
protection of investors and the preservation of the host state’s right to regulate. A 
variety of exceptions and exclusions are stipulated to curb the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdictional outreach and to ensure that it is not unlimited or overly expansive. At 
the same time, significant restrictions and higher procedural requirements are placed 
on investors to prevent frivolous or meritless claims. Therefore, third generation 
100 Art. 19 of the China-Canada BIT (2012).
101 Lee (2013), p. 525.
102 Ibid.
103 Berger (2013a), p. 25.
104 Art. 21(1) of the China-Canada BIT (2012) stipulates that ‘arbitrators shall have expertise or experi-
ence in public international law, international trade or international investment rules, or the resolution 
of disputes arising under international trade or international investment agreements; they should also be 
independent of, and not be affiliated with, or take instructions from, either disputing party’.
105 Art. 26 of the China-Canada BIT (2012).
106 Art. 28 of the China-Canada BIT (2012).
107 Art. 31(1) of the China-Canada BIT (2012).
108 Arts. 27–29 and 33 of the US Model BIT 2004.
523China’s Stance on Investor-State Dispute Settlement:…
123
Chinese BITs recalibrate the liberal approach of ISDS in the second generation in an 
attempt to attain a more balanced ISDS scheme.
5  The Making of the China–EU CAI and the China–US BIT: Towards 
a Fourth Generation
China is in the process of negotiating BITs with the EU and the US. The ongoing 
negotiation of the China–EU CAI was officially launched in November 2013,109 and is 
anticipated to reach a conclusion by the end of 2020.110 Once concluded, the CAI will 
replace the current 25 fragmented BITs that China has concluded with individual EU 
Member States.111 China and the US made their first attempt to negotiate a BIT from 
1983 to 1987, which led to a void of any agreements due to the irreconcilable posi-
tions on many critical aspects.112 In 2008, China and the US commenced a new nego-
tiation for a BIT which seemed to have achieved near completion in 2016.113 However, 
since President Trump took office, the negotiation has come to a halt.
Both the China–EU CAI and the China–US BIT are expected to inaugurate a new 
generation of BITs because of their comprehensive scope and unprecedented con-
tents.114 Despite the lack of a treaty, under pressure from the US, China has agreed 
to further open its market entry to foreign investment by introducing pre-establish-
ment national treatment with a negative list system, which has been established in 
China’s new Foreign Investment Law entered into force on 1 January 2020.115
With regard to ISDS, the CAI and the China–US BIT may demonstrate some 
fundamental disparities. The EU is a determined proponent for the reform of ISDS 
by proposing a bilateral Investment Court System (ICS), to be eventually replaced 
by a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC), which have been integrated into the EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU-Vietnam 
Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) and the EU-Singapore IPA. This makes the 
109 Iuliu Winkler, ‘Legislative Train Schedule, EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment’ 
(European Parliament, 4 September 2020), available at: http://www.europ arl.europ a.eu/legis lativ e-train 
/theme -a-balan ced-and-progr essiv e-trade -polic y-to-harne ss-globa lisat ion/file-eu-china -inves tment -agree 
ment (accessed 23 September 2020).
110 This time goal was first announced at the  21st EU-China Summit held in April 2019. European Coun-
cil, ‘Joint Statement of the  21st EU-China Summit’ (Brussels, 9 April 2019), available at: https ://www.
consi lium.europ a.eu/media /39020 /euchi na-joint -state ment-9apri l2019 .pdf (accessed 6 November 2020).
111 China has concluded 25 BITs with the individual EU Member States except for Ireland. Belgium and 
Luxembourg have jointly negotiated a BIT with China.
112 Cai (2009), p. 486.
113 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Are China and the US Close to Sealing an Investment Treaty?’ (The Diplomat, 24 
March 2016), available at: https ://thedi ploma t.com/2016/03/are-china -and-the-us-close -to-seali ng-an-
inves tment -treat y/ (accessed on 23 September 2020).
114 On the new generation of global IIAs, see Titi (2015), pp. 654–657; Schill and Bray (2017).
115 Arts. 4 and 28 of China’s Foreign Investment Law. Pre-establishment national treatment means that 
China grants no less favourable treatment to foreign investors and their investment at the market entry stage 
than to domestic investors and their investment. The negative list refers to a list of specific sectors and activ-
ities in which foreign investors are either prohibited or restricted from entering the Chinese market.
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EU a determined ‘systemic reformer’ of investor-state arbitration.116 By contrast, the 
US is traditionally an ‘incrementalist’ in ISDS reform, as it favours the retention 
of the current ad hoc investor-state arbitration while proposing modest reforms that 
address specific concerns with regard to the current system.117 China has a tradition 
of adopting a negotiation strategy for BITs that is in deference to the other contract-
ing party.118 For that reason, there is a possibility that the China–EU CAI would 
incorporate the unprecedented ICS that is explicitly advocated by the EU. The 
China–US BIT, provided that a BIT is still a desired option at all, would most likely 
retain the conventional ad hoc investment arbitration with restrictive characteristics 
as adopted in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
6  Challenges and Tentative Solutions to ISDS in the context 
of the Belt and Road Initiative
China’s extensive BIT regime inevitably creates inconsistency in terms of the different 
levels of protection for foreign investors and the fragmentation of foreign investors’ access 
to ISDS. This is the case in particular with countries participating in the BRI. The BRI 
is China’s grand national campaign announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 that pro-
motes connectivity and cooperation in cross-border trade and investment, global infra-
structure development, financing, and people-to-people exchange between China and 
more than 100 participating countries. This section reveals the high legal risks of Chinese 
investments in BRI countries due to the diversified levels of the rule of law in these BRI 
countries, and the lack of access to, or insufficient access to ISDS in Chinese BITs signed 
with BRI countries. Further, this section expounds on two tentative solutions that China 
has adopted to facilitate dispute resolution in the BRI, namely to modernize Chinese BITs 
on a case-by-case basis, and to promote Chinese domestic institutions to resolve transna-
tional disputes, as well as their respective shortfalls and limitations.
6.1  Risks and Uncertainties in Investment Dispute Settlement in the BRI
By the end of January 2020, China has signed Memoranda of Cooperation with 138 
countries concerning the BRI.119
Figure 2 demonstrates that out of 138 BRI countries, 41 of them (30%) have not 
concluded BITs with China, and 60 of them (44%) have first generation BITs with 
China. This suggests that altogether 101 BRI countries have either no investment 
agreements with China or have restricted access to ISDS that only admits disputes 
relating to the amount of compensation for expropriation, accounting for 74% of 
the total BRI countries. And the remaining 37 BRI countries have second or third 
116 Roberts (2018), p. 416.
117 Ibid., p. 415.
118 Berger (2011).
119 A ‘BRI country’ is a loosely defined term. In this article, we define a BRI country as one which has 
officially signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with China to participate in the BRI. Belt and Road Por-
tal, International Cooperation, Profiles, available at: https ://www.yidai yilu.gov.cn/xwzx/roll/77298 .htm 
(accessed 23 September 2020).
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generation BITs with China. Of the 97 BITs China has signed with BRI countries, 9 
of them have been renegotiated, as new BITs or Additional Protocols have replaced 
or modified previously concluded BITs.120
It appears doubtful whether it would be a sound strategy to invest in countries that 
are less economically developed, lack political and social stability and safety, and 
have a weak rule of law and potential neglect to property rights.121 To use 41 BRI 
countries that do not have BITs with China as a sample, the overwhelming major-
ity of them are developing countries, some of which are the world’s least-developed 
countries, with 17 in Africa, and the remainder in Oceania, Central and South Amer-
ica, South Asia and the Middle East (see Table 1). In terms of the level of the rule of 
law, these 41 BRI countries can be particularly problematic. According to the Rule 
of Law Index 2019, out of 20 of these 41 BRI countries where rankings are available 
in the Index, 13 of them rank in the lower half of the entire ranking system (after the 
median ranking No. 63).122 Notably, several countries that occupy the lowest rank-
ings in the Rule of Law Index, inter alia, Venezuela (No. 126), Afghanistan (No. 
120 They include the China-Uzbekistan BIT (2011) replacing the China-Uzbekistan BIT (1992), the 
China-Cuba Modification Agreement (2007) modifying the China-Cuba BIT (1995), the China-Bulgaria 
Additional Protocol (2007) modifying the China-Bulgaria BIT (1989), the China-Russia BIT (2006) 
replacing the China-Russia BIT (1990), the China-Slovakia Additional Protocol (2005) modifying the 
China-Czechoslovakia BIT (1991), the China-Portugal BIT (2005) replacing the China-Portugal BIT 
(1992), the China-BLUE BIT (2005) replacing the China-BLUE BIT (1984), the China-Nigeria BIT 
(2001) replacing the China-Nigeria BIT (1997), and the China-Romania Additional Protocol (2007) 
modifying the China-Romania BIT (1994).














Fig. 2  Three generations of Chinese BITs with BRI countries. Statistics compiled by the authors
122 World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2019, available at: http://data.world justi cepro ject.org/#table 
(accessed 23 September 2020).
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123), Mauritania (No. 122), and Angola (No. 111), are also BRI countries without 
BITs with China (see Table 1). This means that a weak rule of law is a prevalent fea-
ture in BRI countries with which China has not concluded BITs.
When an investment dispute arises between China and one of these 41 BRI coun-
tries that has not concluded any BIT with China, a Chinese investor would either 
resort to legal remedies in the domestic courts, commercial arbitration (in the event 
that state sovereign immunity does not apply), or both governments will have to inter-
vene and resolve the dispute in diplomatic ways. Resorting to the national courts of 
the recipient BRI country could be unreliable due to its inadequate level of the rule 
of law, and resorting to a Chinese domestic court or international commercial arbitra-
tion leads to the enforcement of foreign judgments or foreign arbitral awards by the 
national courts of a BRI country, which could be equally problematic. Some disputes 
with BRI countries are resolved through political and diplomatic channels, but this 
leads to accusations that the Chinese government’s strategy is intended to create well-
orchestrated debt traps and to gain negotiating leverage in geopolitical duelling with 
its neighbouring countries.123 One of the most cited cases of China’s alleged debt 
trap diplomacy with BRI countries is China’s investment in Sri Lanka, with which 
Table 1  BRI countries with no BITs with China and their rankings (out of a total of 126 countries) in the 
Rule of Law Index 2019
Statistics compiled by the authors. Source obtained from World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2019, 
available at: http://data.world justi cepro ject.org/#table (accessed 23 September 2020). The 2019 Index 
covers 126 countries and jurisdictions, ‘-’ means data from that country is not available
Africa Asia and Middle 
East
Europe Americas Oceania
Senegal 52 Timor-Leste - Montenegro - Venezuela 126 Samoa -
Somalia - Vietnam 81 Estonia 10 Suriname 69 Niue -
South Sudan - Nepal 59 Panama 64 Fiji -
Zambia 92 Maldives - El Salvador 84 Federated States of 
Micronesia -
Mauritania 122 Iraq - Dominican Republic 95 Cook Islands -
Angola 111 Afghanistan 123 Antigua and Barbuda 33 Tonga -
Chad - Dominica 45 Solomon Islands -










123 Zhao (2019), p. 10.
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China has no BIT, to build the Hambantota Port. Two Chinese state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs), China Harbor Engineering Company and Sinohydro Corporation, are 
the contractors to build the Port, at a price of 361 million USD, 85% of which was 
loaned to the Sri Lankan government by China’s state-owned Export–Import Bank 
at an annual interest rate of 6.3%. When the Sri Lankan government failed to pay 
its debt in 2017, conditions were negotiated, including a 99-year lease of the Port to 
China Merchants Port Holdings Co. Ltd., and China Merchants Port Holdings’ 70% 
ownership of the parent company of the Hambantota Port, in exchange for writing off 
the entire debt.124 This case was epitomized as a notorious example of China’s insidi-
ous strategy to expand its political and economic influence and to gain control over 
critical infrastructure in other BRI countries, and ultimately to debilitate the state 
sovereignty of the host BRI country.125 This case demonstrates how using a state-
state mechanism to solve investment disputes can often lead to politicization.
Some 60 BRI countries (44%) have a first generation BIT with China, meaning 
that only disputes concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation may 
resort to ISA. Due to the controversial and ambiguous nature of the term ‘amount 
of compensation for expropriation’ in first generation Chinese BITs as contested in 
Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, Sanum v. Laos, BUCG v. Yemen, and China Heilongjiang 
et al. v. Mongolia with inconsistent arbitral outcomes, Chinese investors are placed 
in a rather unpredictable scenario when invoking arbitration under a first genera-
tion Chinese BIT. For disputes regarding matters other than compensation, such as 
an alleged breach of fair and equitable treatment, investors are not able to resort to 
arbitration under a first generation Chinese BIT at all. The limited scope of the arbi-
tration clause in first generation Chinese BITs results in insufficient protection being 
granted to Chinese investors in BRI countries.
6.2  Upgrading the Chinese BIT Regime on a Case‑by‑Case Basis
China has strong incentives to upgrade BITs with BRI countries. First, it is in Chi-
na’s fundamental interest as a home country to upgrade its BIT regime. Considering 
the fact that some Chinese investment in BRI countries is massive in scale, involves 
high risks, and that Chinese investors have either no access or very limited access 
to ISDS, it is in China’s interest to formulate a coherent strategy to negotiate or 
upgrade BITs with BRI countries so as to provide a high level of investment protec-
tion and an effective and predictable ISDS mechanism in a unified term. Second, it 
is also in China’s fundamental interest as a host country to modernize its BIT regime 
in general. The divergent ISDS provisions in Chinese BITs expose China to a posi-
tion of facing potentially a large amount of claims as a result of the ‘out-of-fashion’ 
ISDS provisions.126 This is particularly the case in second generation Chinese BITs 
which cover ‘any disputes in connection to an investment’ or ‘any legal disputes’, as 
124 Carrai (2019).
125 Ibid.
126 Zhang (2017), p. 99.
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these broadly stipulated terms grant virtually unlimited access to ISDS and would 
thus potentially entail a large number of claims against China in the future.127
China has so far adopted four models to upgrade its BITs:128
• A Coexistence Model (parties to a BIT join an FTA with investment provisions 
and both are in effect);
• A Replacement Model (a newly negotiated BIT replaces an old one);
• An Amendment Model (partially amending a BIT with a protocol);
• A Joint Interpretation Model (parties make diplomatic statements to interpret an 
existing BIT).
Using these four methods simultaneously, China has upgraded 32 BITs, account-
ing for 28% of all Chinese BITs concluded. The most frequently used model is the 
Coexistence Model (18 BITs), followed by the Replacement Model (12 BITs), the 
Amendment Model (4 BITs), and the Joint Interpretation Model (the only example 
being two diplomatic statements made by Laos and China in Sanum v. Laos).129
To upgrade Chinese BITs on a case-by-case basis creates some hardship. It is first 
and foremost an arduous and onerous task, concerning the significant amount of effort 
and time that are required to renegotiate more than 100 Chinese BITs that are in force 
on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the renegotiation of Chinese BITs does not guar-
antee consistency in their ISDS clauses, because the substance of each BIT is a result 
of consensus by both negotiating parties, and China’s negotiating parties’ diversified 
positions and approaches on ISDS would still lead to fragmented ISDS provisions in 
China’s BIT regime as a whole. Furthermore, China’s policy on ISDS reform, other 
than the identified three generations of ISDS provisions in Chinese BITs, remains 
unpredictable and somewhat elusive, since China has not concluded any new BITs 
after the China–Tanzania BIT in 2013. China is yet to formulate a coherent and defini-
tive approach in drafting ISDS provisions in newly negotiated or renegotiated BITs in 
the future. Other problems involve the creation of treaty overlaps and treaty shopping 
in the Coexistence Model, and the ambiguity of the transition clause in ISDS provi-
sions in BITs in the Replacement Model as demonstrated in Ping An v. Belgium.130
6.3  Promoting Domestic Institutions to Resolve BRI Disputes
In recent years, Chinese arbitration institutions have adopted new arbitration rules to 
expand their jurisdiction to admit investor-state disputes. The initiative was taken by 
the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) in 2016 through revising its 
arbitration rules to include investor-state arbitration,131 followed by the China Inter-
national Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC)’s investor-state 
127 Ibid., pp. 90–91; Chen (2006).
128 Huang (2018).
129 Ibid., pp. 94–95.
130 Ibid., pp. 94–95.
131 SCIA, Arbitration Rules (2016), Art. 2.2, available at: http://120.25.66.138/web/doc/view_rules /939.
html (accessed 23 September 2020).
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arbitration rules in 2017,132 and the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC)’s rules for 
international investment arbitration adopted in 2019.133
In addition, two China International Commercial Courts (CICC) under the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) have been established in Shenzhen and Xi’an in 
2018, which were originally designed to resolve both investor-state and commercial 
disputes exclusively arising out of the BRI.134 Despite the CICC being branded by 
the media as ‘the Belt and Road Courts’,135 eventually their jurisdiction only cov-
ers international commercial disputes between private parties, and is not exclusive 
to the BRI.136 However, this does not exclude the possibility in the future that the 
CICC will be entrusted with the competence to deal with cases relating to investor-
state arbitration, such as the enforcement of ISA awards.
Despite China’s ambition demonstrated by recent institutional innovations, some 
basic issues remain unresolved. First of all, Chinese investors now have the option to 
resolve their contractual investment disputes by utilizing the CICC or to solve treaty-
based disputes in three competent Chinese arbitration institutions, hence gaining a 
‘home advantage’ and in the hope of obtaining a favourable outcome. The problems 
that are inherent in this approach, however, are also apparent. The home advantage 
that a Chinese disputant wishes to obtain may well be exactly a disadvantage that a 
foreign disputant wishes to avoid. A foreign disputant, either private or sovereign, will 
have a compelling rationale to resolve disputes with a Chinese party in a neutral third-
party venue outside China, rather than doing so in a Chinese institution in China which 
does not in general convey a strong propensity to impartiality and high-level adjudica-
tive quality. This is the case in particular in view of the fact that China’s own level 
of the rule of law is perceived as relatively weak, as demonstrated by its relatively 
low ranking in the Rule of Law Index  (82nd place out of 126 countries).137 A substan-
tial improvement in judicial authority and credibility requires consistent and effective 
endeavour and demonstration in judicial practice, which need to build over time.
Even more problematic is the fact that the mandate of the three Chinese arbitration 
institutions to hear ISA cases lacks a proper legal basis. China’s Arbitration Law, which 
was last revised in September 2017, explicitly stipulates that only disputes between equal 
parties, being citizens, legal persons and other organizations, are arbitrable.138 Hence, 
there is an outstanding conflict between China’s Arbitration Law and the three Chinese 
132 CIETAC, International Investment Arbitration Rules (For Trial Implementation) (2017), available at: 
http://www.cieta c.org/index .php?m=Page&a=index &id=390&l=en (accessed 23 September 2020).
133 BAC, Rules for International Investment Arbitration (2019), available at: http://www.bjac.
org.cn/page/data_dl/2019%E6%8A%95%E8%B5%84%E4%BB%B2%E8%A3%81%E8%A7%8
4%E5%88%99090 5%20%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87.pdf (accessed 23 September 2020).
134 Chen (2020), p. 102.
135 Jonathan E. Hillman and Matthew P. Goodman, ‘China’s “Belt and Road” Court to Challenge Cur-
rent US-Led Order’ (Financial Times, 24 July 2018), available at: https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/b64d7 f2e-
8f4d-11e8-b639-7680c edcc4 21 (accessed 23 September 2020).
136 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court of China on Several Issues Regarding the Establishment of 
the International Commercial Court (Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court Fa Shi [2018] 
11 on 25 June 2018, effective on 1 July 2018), Art. 2.
137 Rule of Law Index 2019, above n. 122.
138 Arbitration Law of China (Promulgated by the National People’s Congress on 1 September 2017, 
effective on 1 January 2018), Art. 2.
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arbitration institutions’ newly gained competence concerning investor-state disputes.139 
This may only be solved with a new round of Arbitration Law amendments.
7  China’s Policy Options in ISDS Reform
7.1  Investor‑State Arbitration with a Standing Appellate Body
To propose an appeal mechanism in IIAs is anything but an unprecedented practice. 
One research has found that out of more than 3300 IIAs worldwide, around 25 already 
contained provisions contemplating an appeal mechanism for investment arbitra-
tion.140 Out of these 25 IIAs with such a mechanism, the majority proposed the nego-
tiation of a bilateral appellate body first and then a multilateral agreement establishing 
an appellate body in the future; however, two IIAs, namely the China–Australia FTA 
(2015) and the Canada-South Korea FTA (2014), contained provisions pertaining to 
the negotiation of a bilateral appellate body only.141 The China–Australia FTA is the 
first and only attempt in China’s IIA-making history to contemplate an appellate body. 
Article 9.23 of the China–Australia FTA (2015) stipulates that: ‘Within three years 
after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall commence nego-
tiations with a view to establishing an appellate mechanism to review awards rendered 
[…] in arbitrations commenced after any such appellate mechanism is established. 
Any such appellate mechanism would hear appeals on questions of law.’ This attempt, 
however, has so far not resulted in any substantial outcome.
In July 2019, China submitted its reform proposal to the UNCITRAL WG III.142 In 
China’s view, the current ISDS system is flawed with several main problems: a lack of 
an error-correcting mechanism; a lack of stability and predictability for arbitral awards; 
the questioned professionalism and independence of arbitrators; unregulated third-party 
funding; and long and costly procedures.143 Consequently, while being ‘open to pos-
sible proposals for improving the ISDS mechanism’, China is inclined to further study 
the possibility of establishing a permanent appellate mechanism.144 This notably sug-
gests the retention of (reformed) investor-state arbitration in combination with an appeal 
mechanism which could ‘help improve error-correcting mechanisms, strengthen legal 
expectations for investment dispute settlement and establish limitations for the conduct 
139 Qi (2020), p. 122.
140 Van den Berg (2019), pp. 159–160.
141 Ibid., p. 161.
142 UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Sub-
mission from the Government of China, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.177 (19 July 2019), available at: https ://
undoc s.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.177 (accessed 23 September 2020).
143 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
144 Other reform proposals that China has made include safeguarding the right of parties to appoint arbi-
trators; improving arbitrators’ qualifications, conflict of interest and their selection and removal proce-
dures; the promotion of alternative dispute resolution measures; a three to six-month compulsory consul-
tation period prior to the commencement of arbitration; and more transparency for third-party funding. 
Ibid., p. 4.
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of judges’.145 As identified by Anthea Roberts, ISDS reformers can be placed in three 
main categories, namely incrementalists, systemic reformers, and paradigm shifters.146 
China’s stance on ISDS reform in the UNCITRAL WG III seems to be in the middle 
ground between an incrementalist and a systemic reformer: China acknowledges the 
structural problems of the current ISDS mechanism and prefers to reform the system 
in ways that are more than merely incremental, such as a permanent and multilateral 
appellate mechanism; but at the same time it is hesitant to go as far as officially endors-
ing an MIC as proposed by systemic reformers such as the EU.147
7.2  A Multilateral Instrument Under UNCITRAL Working Group III
Since 2017 UNCITRAL WG III has been mandated to work on possible ISDS reform. 
The deliberations of WG III have resulted in various options for ISDS reform being 
put forward by states. In order to persuade a significant number of states to partici-
pate in UNCITRAL ISDS reform, WG III has introduced a ‘multilateral instrument’ 
approach,148 which intends to provide a framework that integrates various reform 
options for states to choose to implement. A state could decide to use one or a com-
bination of multiple approaches in their choices. The options provided are as follows:
• A reformed investor-state arbitration;
• A limited reform of certain aspects of ISA, such as a code of conduct, new mech-
anisms for the selection and appointment of arbitrators, and certain procedures, 
such as the dismissal of frivolous claims or expedited proceedings;
• A multilateral standing mechanism;
• Only inter-state dispute settlement;
• A mixture of a multilateral standing mechanism, certain elements of such a 
mechanism, ISA and certain elements of ISA.149
All of these ISDS reform proposals as submitted to WG III are competing with 
each other. As Schill and Vidigal observe, one would be tempted to ‘seek multi-
lateral consensus by opening a debate about the pros and cons of each model […] 
until a large majority of states are able to agree on one model’; ‘yet, it is unlikely 
that one model ultimately will find such universal support, as the different positions 
on investment dispute settlement design reflect largely entrenched political stances’ 
145 Ibid.
146 Roberts (2018).
147 Du and Shen (2020), p. 23.
148 UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Mul-
tilateral Instrument on ISDS Reform, Note by the Secretariat, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP194 (16 January 2020), 
available at: https ://uncit ral.un.org/sites /uncit ral.un.org/files /wp194 _multi later al_instr ument _for_submi 
ssion .pdf (accessed 23 September 2020).
149 Ibid., para. 16. Other proposals to reform ISDS have been put forward by international organizations 
and in academia. Jose E. Alvarez, for instance, classifies them into three groups in reforming the current 
ISDS regime, from the perspectives of ‘rule of law, vertical concerns and horizontal concerns’. Alvarez 
(2011), pp. 393–406.
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with little room for compromise.150 Hence, it is of paramount importance to main-
tain an ‘open structure’ in ISDS reform in order to garner the widest possible level 
of state participation, instead of excluding one another.151
This multilateral instrument, once materialized, can be employed by China as an avail-
able tool to gradually upgrade its BIT regime. Depending on the other contracting 
party, China may adopt one or more instruments to cater for the stance of the other 
negotiating state. For instance, the China–India BIT (2006), which included second 
generation ISDS provisions, was unilaterally terminated by India in 2016, along 
with another 56 IIAs that India was a contracting party to, due to India’s intention 
to renegotiate its entire BIT regime based on a new Model BIT passed in 2015.152 
The 2015 Indian Model BIT requires the exhaustion of local remedies before resort-
ing to ISA, whereby an investor must first exhaust all local remedies for a minimum 
period of five years since the investor first acquired knowledge of a treaty breach, 
followed by an obligation to use best efforts to resolve the dispute amicably for an 
additional cooling-off period of six months, prior to the possible commencement of 
the ISA procedure.153 If the renegotiation of the China–India BIT is on the table, 
China may agree to a limited reform of certain aspects of ISA, namely the strength-
ening or exhaustion of domestic remedies to resolve investor-state disputes. China 
and Brazil currently do not have a BIT in place; the dispute resolution mechanism 
in a future BIT, if at all, would likely include an ombudsman and state-state arbitra-
tion instead of ISA, as Brazil has never ratified IIAs containing ISA provisions,154 
and adamantly advocates so in its submission to the WG III.155 Another example is 
South Africa which in its submission to the WG III proposes a mixture of possible 
reform instruments.156 This means upgrading ISDS provisions in the China–South 
Africa BIT (1997), which belongs to the second generation of Chinese BITs, would 
be an open-ended option for both negotiating parties from the inventories of the 
multilateral instrument.
The use of a multilateral instrument will give China the policy flexibility to con-
clude new or renegotiate existing BITs with other states in a way that is adaptive of 
other states’ wide range of preferences and engagements in ISDS reform. However, 
one implication of this approach is that dispute resolution in China’s BIT regime 
will likely be developed to further fragmentation than the status quo: not only are 
150 Schill and Vidigal (2020), p. 320.
151 Ibid.
152 Agarwal (2019), p. 11.
153 India Model BIT (2015), Art. 15.
154 Vidigal and Stevens (2018), p. 485.
155 UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Sub-
mission from the Government of Brazil, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.171 (11 June 2019), available at: https ://
undoc s.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.171 (accessed 23 September 2020).
156 They include the use of dispute prevention policies, the use of alternative dispute resolution such as con-
ciliation and mediation, the use of domestic courts and domestic administrative review procedures, setting up 
an ombuds office, state-state cooperation in dispute prevention, and the banning of, or otherwise more trans-
parent, third-party funding. South Africa was very skeptical about the establishment of a multilateral invest-
ment court and an appellate mechanism. UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission from the Government of South Africa, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176 (17 
July 2019), available at: https ://undoc s.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176 (accessed 23 September 2020).
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there different generations of Chinese BITs already in existence, but also diverse and 
new approaches to dispute resolution provisions in future BITs negotiated with dif-
ferent contracting states will be adopted.
The EU’s proposal for the ICS on the bilateral level is expected to serve a tempo-
rary and transitional function and lay the foundation for a permanent MIC on the inter-
national level in the future, as envisaged by the EU. This ultimate objective is endorsed 
in the EU’s submission to UNCITRAL WG III in January 2019 to establish a stand-
ing mechanism for the settlement of international investment disputes.157 According 
to the EU, systemic structural reform is the only way that can effectively address all 
of the major concerns that are raised in current ad hoc arbitration, because incremen-
tal reform only addresses certain specific concerns and leaves others untouched.158 
Therefore, by creating a court-like system with two instances with qualified judges and 
rule-based transparent proceedings, a standing MIC is going to bring consistency, pre-
dictability and correctness of judgements; independence, impartiality, expertise and 
diversity of adjudicators; and transparency and efficiency of the procedure.159 In order 
to cover a large amount of existing and future IIAs and to adjudicate disputes arising 
therefrom, once the instrument establishing the MIC is concluded and open for acces-
sion, parties to existing BITs can make an ‘opt-in’ notification, stating that future dis-
putes arising out of those BITs will be subject to the jurisdiction of the MIC.160
It is predicted that the establishment of an MIC needs the support of a minimum of 
approximately 40 states.161 Once the MIC is established, China could make use of the 
opt-in mechanism to upgrade and unify its current diversified three generations of ISDS 
provisions, by making joint statements with other contracting states to repeal the ISDS 
provisions in the current Chinese BIT regime and conferring jurisdiction to the MIC for 
investor-state disputes arising out of existing Chinese BITs. In this way, ISDS provisions in 
existing Chinese BITs would be gradually substituted by the MIC through individual bilat-
eral joint statements, instead of a renegotiation of the entire BIT regime which would take 
much more effort to achieve. For countries that do not yet have a BIT with China, a clear 
and direct reference to the MIC can be made if a prospective BIT is on the agenda.
8  Conclusion
This article explicates the evolving modalities and complexity of ISDS provisions in Chi-
na’s existing three generations of BITs and a fourth generation that is in the making, as 
well as the necessity and the challenges involved in modernizing and harmonizing these 
BITs from a Chinese perspective and in the international context of ISDS reform. China’s 
large number of BITs with diversified ISDS provisions and potential ISDS reform options 
157 European Commission, Submission of the European Union and Its Member States to UNCITRAL 
Working Group III, Establishing a Standing Mechanism for the Settlement of International Invest-
ment Disputes (18 January 2019), available at: http://trade .ec.europ a.eu/docli b/docs/2019/janua ry/trado 
c_15763 1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2020).
158 Ibid., para. 10.
159 Ibid., paras. 40–56.
160 Ibid., para. 35.
161 Bungenberg and Reinisch (2018), p. 3.
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aggravate the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect. The ISDS provisions in China’s 126 BITs that are 
currently in force have become so fragmented and diversified, from being rather restric-
tive to very liberal, all of which co-exist and remain in effect today. This fragmentation 
presents a dire need for a modernized and unified ISDS mechanism. Although China has 
already attempted to enhance its existing BITs through a number of ways, some upgrades 
have created new problems in practice, for instance the ambiguity of the transition clause 
in ISDS provisions in successive BITs as demonstrated in Ping An v. Belgium.
China’s active, if not aggressive, outbound investment in the context of the BRI 
increases the potential for an extensive use of ISDS in the future. In the course of 
modernizing its large BIT regime, China faces a dilemma. On the one hand, as the 
world’s second largest capital-importing country, it is in China’s defensive interest as 
a host state to avoid frequent and frivolous claims lodged by foreign investors against 
China in international arbitration, which implies that ISDS provisions in Chinese 
BITs should include mechanisms that effectively curb the possibility of frivolous and 
unmeritorious claims, admit a higher threshold for investors to file claims, and limit 
the interpretative autonomy of arbitral tribunals to avoid inconsistent outcomes. On 
the other hand, as the world’s largest capital-exporting country, and notably in the 
context of outbound investment in the BRI, it is also in China’s offensive interest as 
an investors’ home state to protect Chinese investors and their investments abroad. 
This offensive position suggests that ISDS provisions in Chinese BITs should be lib-
eral and in open terms in order to ensure that Chinese investors have as much access 
as possible to the international settlement of investment disputes.
Considering the fact that to modernize the large number of Chinese BITs on a 
treaty-by-treaty basis would be an onerous and formidable task, one may deem that 
it is in China’s long-term interest to support the route of an MIC. By utilizing the 
opt-in mechanism, China would be able to upgrade and replace the fragmented ISDS 
provisions in the current Chinese BIT regime with the institutional and procedural 
designs as provided by the MIC that arguably correct many of the structural prob-
lems of the current ad hoc arbitration system, without the necessity to renegotiate 
the entire substantive and procedural provisions of a BIT on a case-by-case basis. 
Be that as it may, it still remains uncertain if or when China is willing to endorse the 
establishment of an MIC initiated and advocated by the EU.
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See Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































550 Y. Li, C. Bian 
123
References
Agarwal A (2019) Rethinking the regulation of international foreign investment: recent developments 
in Brazil, South Africa and India. Indian J Int Econ Law 10:1–17
Alvarez JE (2011) The public international law regime governing international investment. Brill 
Nijhoff, The Hague
Amerasinghe CF (2004) Local remedies in international law, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge
Berger A (2011) The politics of China’s investment treaty-making program. In: Broude T, Busch ML, 
Porges A (eds) The politics of international economic law. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, pp 162–185
Berger A (2013a) Investment rules in Chinese preferential trade and investment agreements: is China 
following the global trend towards comprehensive agreements? https ://www.die-gdi.de/uploa ds/
media /DP_7.2013.pdf. Accessed 23 Sept 2020
Berger A (2013) Investment rules in Chinese PTIAs: a partial ‘NAFTA-ization’ reintegration. In: Hof-
mann R, Schill S, Tams C (eds) Preferential trade and investment agreements: from recalibration 
to reintegration. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 297–333
Berger A (2015) Hesitant embrace: China’s recent approach to international investment rule-making. 
JWIT 16:843–868
Brauch MD (2017) Exhaustion of local remedies in international investment law. https ://www.iisd.
org/syste m/files /publi catio ns/best-pract ices-exhau stion -local -remed ies-law-inves tment -en.pdf. 
Accessed 23 Sept 2020
Bungenberg M, Reinisch A (2018) From bilateral arbitral tribunals and investment courts to a multi-
lateral investment court: options regarding the institutionalization of investor-state dispute settle-
ment. Springer, Berlin
Cai C (2006) Outward foreign direct investment protection and the effectiveness of Chinese BIT prac-
tice. JWIT 7:621–652
Cai C (2009) China-US BIT negotiations and the future of investment treaty regime: a grand bilateral 
bargain with multilateral implications. JIEL 12:457–506
Caplan LM, Sharpe JK (2013) Chapter 18: United States. In: Brown C (ed) Commentaries on selected 
model investment treaties. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 755–851
Carrai MA (2019) China’s malleable sovereignty along the Belt and Road Initiative: the case of the 
99-year Chinese lease of Hambantota Port. NYU J Int Law Pol 51:1061–1099
Chen A (2006) Should the four great safeguards in Sino-foreign BITs be hastily dismantled? Com-
ments on provisions concerning dispute settlement in model US and Canada BITs. JWIT 
7:899–933
Chen H (2020) Reforming ISDS: a Chinese perspective. In: Li Y, Qi T, Bian C (eds) China, the EU 
and international investment law: reforming investor-state dispute settlement. Routledge, London, 
pp 100–111
Chi M (2017) From Europeanization toward Americanization: the shift of China’s dichotomic investment 
treaty-making strategy. Can Foreign Policy J 23:158–170
Chi M, Wang X (2015) The evolution of ISA clauses in Chinese IIAs and its practical implications: the 
admissibility of disputes for investor-state arbitration. JWIT 16:869–898
De Brabandere E, Lemeire S (2017) The jurisdiction ratione temporis of international investment tribu-
nals: some observations on the Decision of the Tribunal in Ping An v Belgium. https ://paper s.ssrn.
com/sol3/paper s.cfm?abstr act_id=29940 93. Accessed 23 Sept 2020
Douglas Z (2011) The MFN clause in investment arbitration: treaty interpretation off the rails. J Int Dis-
pute Settl 2:97–113
Du M, Shen W (2020) The future of investor-state dispute settlement: exploring China’s changing atti-
tude. In: Chaisse J, Choukroune L, Jusoh S (eds) Handbook of international investment law and 
policy. Springer, Singapore, pp 1–24
Ferdinand P (2016) Westward ho—the China dream and ‘One belt, One road’: Chinese foreign policy 
under Xi Jinping. Int Affs 92:941–957
Gallagher N (2016) Role of China in investment: BITs, SOEs, private enterprises, and evolution of pol-
icy. ICSID Rev 31:88–103
Hadley K (2013) Do China’s BITs matter? Assessing the effect of China’s investment agreements on 
foreign direct investment flows, investors’ rights, and the rule of law. Georget J Int Law 45:255–324
Huang J (2018) Procedural models to upgrade BITs: China’s experience. LJIL 31:93–115
551China’s Stance on Investor-State Dispute Settlement:…
123
Hwang M, Chang A (2015) Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v Sanum Investments 
Ltd: a tale of two letters. ICSID Rev 30:506–524
Hwang M, Chang A (2018) Of forks and dead ends: Sanum Investments Ltd v Government of the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic. ICSID Rev 33:156–180
Ji Y (2011) Voluntary ‘westernization’ of the expropriation rules in Chinese BITs and its implication: an 
empirical study. JWIT 12:81–99
Lee J (2013) An important first stride, but beware of the pitfalls: a critical analysis of the ISDS mecha-
nism of the 2012 Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Investment Treaty. Chin JIL 12:509–541
Levine M (2019) Towards a fourth generation of Chinese treaty practice: substantive changes, balancing 
mechanisms, and selective adaption. In: Chaisse J (ed) China’s international investment strategy: 
bilateral, regional, and global law and policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 205–221
Qi T (2020) China’s policy on ISDS reform: institutional choice in a diversified era. In: Li Y, Qi T, Bian 
C (eds) China, the EU and international investment law: reforming investor-state dispute settlement. 
Routledge, London, pp 112–123
Reinisch A (2011) How narrow are narrow dispute settlement clauses in investment treaties? JIDS 
2:115–174
Ren Q (2016) Ping An v Belgium: temporal jurisdiction of successive BITs. ICSID Rev 31:129–137
Roberts A (2018) Incremental, systemic, and paradigmatic reform of investor-state arbitration. AJIL 
112:410–432
Rooney KM (2007) ICSID and BIT arbitrations and China. J Int Arbitr 24:689–712
Scharaw B (2018) The (provisional) end of debates on narrow dispute settlement clauses in PRC first-
generation BITs?—China Heilongjiang et al v Mongolia. Arbitr Int 34:293–306
Schill SW (2007) Tearing down the Great Wall: the new generation investment treaties of the People’s 
Republic of China. Cardozo J Int & Comp Law 15:73–118
Schill SW, Bray HL (2017) The brave new (American) world of international investment law: substantive 
investment protection standards in mega-regionals. In: Rensmann T (ed) Mega-regional trade agree-
ments. Springer, Cham, pp 123–154
Schill SW, Vidigal G (2020) Designing investment dispute settlement à la carte: insights from compara-
tive institutional design analysis. LAPE 18:314–344
Shan W (2005) The legal framework of EU-China investment relations: a critical appraisal. Hart Publish-
ing, Portland
Shen W (2010) Is this a great leap forward? A comparative review of the investor-state arbitration clause 
in the ASEAN-China Investment Treaty: from BIT jurisprudential and practical perspectives. J Int 
Arbitr 27:379–419
Shen W (2011) The good, the bad or the ugly? A critique of the Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence 
in Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru. Chin JIL 10:55–95
Titi C (2015) International investment law and the European Union: towards a new generation of interna-
tional investment agreements. EJIL 26:639–661
Van den Berg AJ (2019) Appeal mechanism for ISDS awards: interaction with the New York and ICSID 
Conventions. ICSID Rev 34:156–189
Vidigal G, Stevens B (2018) Brazil’s new model of dispute settlement for investment: return to the past or 
alternative for the future? JWIT 19:475–512
Willems JY (2011) The settlement of investor state disputes and China: new developments on ICSID 
jurisdiction. S C J Int Law Bus 8:1–62
Zhang S (2017) China’s approach in drafting the investor-state arbitration clause: a review from the ‘Belt 
and Road’ regions’ perspective. CJCL 5:79–109
Zhao S (2019) China’s Belt-Road Initiative as the signature of President Xi Jinping diplomacy: easier 
said than done. J Contemp China 28:1–17
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
